Expect a ‘colourful’ response from China over Pelosi visit | CNN
E&OE TRANSCRIPT BY CNN
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’AMANPOUR’ 1 AUGUST 2022
- Thank you so much for joining us. So it looks like this visit by the Speaker Pelosi is all but certain. It's just a matter of how long she will be there on the ground in Taiwan. Is this trip a good idea in your opinion?
KEVIN RUDD: Well, I think you're right that the confirmations today here in the United States would appear to be that the visit to Taiwan is proceeding. And so therefore our analysis should go to the question of how should now China and the United States government, the Administration, respond to what happens. On your question has it been wise for Speaker Pelosi to go, on balance, my judgment is no. Because I simply ask this question looking at any form of official contact between the United States and Taiwan, which is, does it help in aggregate terms maintain Taiwan's own security and does it help sustain the status quo of Taiwan? This visit doesn't really help that. In fact, it to some extent, impinges negatively on it by raising tensions further again. If we're talking about some other contact between elements of the United States military or whatever with the Taiwanese, that's a different matter. You could probably justify that in terms of enhancing Taiwan's overall security. But not this one.
- Well this visit, if it does happen, would be the most senior visit by a US official since 1997. And that was Speaker Newt Gingrich at the time when he visited Taiwan. Let me get your to respond to the heated rhetoric the ratcheting of tensions we've heard from the Chinese leadership let's just have you listen to and respond to China's foreign minister spokesman and how he addressed this impending visit.
ZHAO LIJIAN: [SPEAKING CHINESE]
INTERPRETER: We would like to sternly warn the US once again that China is standing by and the People's Liberation Army will never sit idly by. China will take resolute responses and strong countermeasures to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity. As for what measures if she dares to go, then let's wait and see.
- So we have those words from him. China's military says that it will quote, "bury incoming enemies." What is their play and strategy here in ratcheting up what many officials, would say, yes, this is maybe perhaps the most high profile visit by a US official. But we have [INAUDIBLE] traveling to Taiwan quite regularly.
KEVIN RUDD: Yeah. I think it's important to put this into perspective and Zhao Lijian, who you just quoted or just had on screen, the foreign ministry spokesman is in fact, a Wolf Warrior from central casting. His job is to make Xi Jinping happy every morning when he looks at his television screen, less his job to convey accurately what the Chinese military are likely to do. So the real question here is, what will the Chinese military now do in response to the Pelosi visit? My judgment for what it's worth, is as follows. One, that the Chinese do not have an interest in using a military response to the Pelosi visit to run the risk of an open armed confrontation with the United States. And the reason is Xi Jinping three months out for the National Congress, 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, does not want to bear the risk of such a conflict with the United States going wrong, in other words, for there to be anything less than a decisive victory. So therefore my judgment is the Chinese response to the Pelosi visit is not going to be so extreme that it would run the risk of direct military escalation with the United States itself. But secondly, it will, however, be a colorful response and I think primarily directed at the Taiwanese themselves in order to make a domestic political point to Taiwanese public opinion that China is serious.
- So given that, and given that you say that the pressure now and the focus on Xi Jinping in the upcoming months the Communist Party Congress set to meet where he will likely be getting a third unprecedented term and quote unquote leader for life. Subsequently, he's got economic issues at home, an economy that's slowing, a COVID policy that's no longer functioning and working, and a US President who on the phone yesterday in public last week and publicly has said the US still stands by a one China policy. So all of that having been said, why even ratchet up the tension now with this heated rhetoric?
KEVIN RUDD: Well Xi Jinping is not in political danger on the home front. I've seen a lot of incorrect analysis on that score. His political position is quite secure and he will in my judgment be reappointed to a third term in October, November. Furthermore, that's despite the weakening of the Chinese economy and despite the fact that that weakening has occurred because of a whole range of policy missteps I believe by the Chinese administration. So why are they doing this? The whole question of Taiwan for foreigners to understand is along these lines. It is a matter of deep religious belief, ideological belief, within the Chinese Communist Party that the reunification of the mainland with Taiwan is a total article of faith. Therefore it's a part of domestic Communist Party politics to continue to demonstrate that China's resolve on taking Taiwan at some stage remains absolutely unshaken. I'm less worried about that military scenario unfolding in the immediate period ahead. I'm much more worried frankly, about the trajectory for the late 2020s and the early 2030s when China calculates the balance of power and its financial resilience will be stronger than it is now.
- Why would you and your assessment say that despite all of the negative headlines now coming out of China, whether it's the economy, whether it's COVID, whether it's their demographics longer term, why is his power still as strong as it is in your view?
KEVIN RUDD: Well Xi Jinping since he took over in the end of 2012 has been engaged in a 10 year long campaign of internal power consolidation. We often don't get full visibility of this in the outside world. But the bottom line is there have been a series of purges internally within the Chinese leadership in order to remove anyone who is either actively an opponent of Xi Jinping or prospectively an opponent of Xi Jinping. And so that therefore creates a dynamic whereby China, I'm sorry, Xi Jinping's leadership has become progressively more consolidated. So therefore the question in my mind is not whether Xi Jinping gets reappointed. The real question is whether there's enough pressure in the system to secure an appointment to the premiership, the person responsible for the economic leadership team within China to be appointed and to course correct on China's I think, quite damaging set of economic policy settings which have been put in place under Xi Jinping, not just over COVID but in the years in the years prior to COVID as well.
- Let's go back to the issue over Taiwan. In 2017, Xi Jinping said the country is quote complete reunification was an inevitable requirement for realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. I'm just curious in your view, because there are conflicting thoughts here as to whether the war in Ukraine has changed that calculus at all.
KEVIN RUDD: I don't believe so. And that's because the Chinese Communist Party marches to the beat of its own drum. That quote you just read out is a really important one. Because that's where Xi Jinping defined for the first time there is a timetable for Taiwanese reunification. And that's 2049. That is the date which Xi Jinping has set for, quote the final realization of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, which he's now said explicitly cannot be achieved in the absence of national unity with Taiwan. So if you like, we are already on an historical time track over the next 2 and 1/2 decades or so. That I think is what drives the central agenda here. In terms of their ability to realize it and when they could realize it, the calculation is not so much informed by Ukraine, the PLA will make huge number of battle studies of what's actually happened in the field between Ukrainian and Russian forces. But China has been militarily preparing for this scenario and most critically economic and financially preparing And they still realize they've got more preparations to make.
- Yeah, and one could argue that Russia and the Kremlin, and Vladimir Putin to be specific, also had military and economic preparations in place before February 24. And clearly things did not go according to plan. China, perhaps a bit more sophisticated, obviously a much larger economy. That having been said, its own military has not been tested with the real land war and quite a long period of time. And we've seen some of the economic as you mentioned some of the economic policies that have been laid out by Xi Jinping have actually been quite detrimental to the country as of late. So how secure should he feel about his views on his own military and his plans vis a vis Taiwan?
KEVIN RUDD: Well you're absolutely right to say that the Chinese military sense their own vulnerabilities. Over the years in various capacities, I now run an American think tank, the Asia Society here in New York. But as prime minister, foreign minister, member of parliament, and in an earlier life as a diplomat professional diplomat. I've had many engagements with the Chinese military. I've lectured at their defense academies. I know the culture of these establishments. It is intrinsically quite a conservative culture. They don't believe in going to war unless they are 1,000% convinced they're going to win. You're right to say their recent campaign experience has been limited. The '79 border war between China and Vietnam ended badly for China. The last naval engagement between China and an outside country was in 1895 in the Battle of Shimonoseki against Japan, which to the Chinese Qing Empire was comprehensively defeated. And when we talk about Taiwan, that would be the single largest amphibious operation, if it was, in fact, going to be a full invasion since D-day. So for these reasons, China looks at Ukraine and it causes them to, as it were, think even more rigorously about their own need for full scale military preparedness. Their critique of Putin internally would be, what a dummy. He went to war and he wasn't ready for it. The Chinese don't believe they're dummies and frankly militarily they're not. And I think they're therefore in line for a much more significant set of preparations militarily and critically, financially and economically over time.
- Yeah militarily there have been some skirmishes with India, but nothing of the scale of a massive land war. That's for sure. You have met with Xi Jinping, obviously not in his current role. But I'm just curious, given your take of his personality, his vision for the country, his let's quite frankly say his ego, where do you see him in terms of the direction of the country, leading the country, and its relationship with the United States, specifically related to what you call should be a policy of managed strategic competition. Is he open, is he the kind of person who would be open to that type of Arrangement
KEVIN RUDD: I've had quite a lot of engagement with Xi Jinping in one form or another over the years as prime minister when he was vice president, but also frankly when he was president as well. My term of office expired at the end of 2013 when I lost the 2013 election in Australia. And since then frankly, as a think tanker, I've been in Beijing and smaller group meetings with Xi Jinping on a number of occasions. So I have had an exposure to the way in which his worldview has been developed, his thinking, and his view of his own role in history. What's my conclusion from all of that is that Xi Jinping sees himself, like Putin, as a man of history. He's not content with the status quo. He sees China as having a rising military, political, foreign policy, economic, technological, and ideological role in the region and the wider world. And the degree of change in Xi Jinping's China over the last decade has been profound. As the politics of the country has moved to the left and so has the economy as we've just spoken of. On managed strategic competition it's a critical question you ask. And yes, it is a subject of the book that I've just written. Essentially that's about putting guardrails or rules of the road around the core strategic tensions over Taiwan, South China Sea, East China Sea, Korean Peninsula, and cyber and space. This is where frankly a full blown crisis could erupt on any day of the week through accident. So I notice the US administration is beginning to reflect the need for guardrails in its own language, the need for a managed competition in its own language Xi Jinping interestingly the other day after his video summit with President Biden, went out of his way explicitly to rule out the notion of strategic competition. Now as a concept to, as it were, describe the bilateral relationship we might ask why. My best answer to that is Xi Jinping's formal doctrine for the US China relationship is one of no conflict, no confrontation, win-win cooperation, and mutual respect for each other's political systems. Of course, that's not the reality. But if you admit the reality of strategic competition, you're actually saying that you do wish to become the preeminent power regionally and globally. And that's not China's current official script.
- Former prime minister Kevin Rudd we'll have to have you back on to talk about domestic politics back at home and Australia, get your take on how the new prime minister from your own party Anthony Albanese is doing in your view. But we'll have you on later for another time to discuss that. Thank you so much for your time. We appreciate it.
KEVIN RUDD: Happy to do so.